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Abstract
The Asian economic resurgence was first initiated by Japan after 
the end of World War II. Japan’s economy grew rapidly during 
the three decades from 1950 at the rate of almost 10 percent per 
year, with its GDP growing to be twice as big as that of Britain and 
almost half of the U.S. economy by 1980, becoming the second 
largest economy of the world after the United States. Similarly, 
Korea was able to replicate comparable economic successes as 
in Japan, even though the Korean economic drive started more 
than a decade later than in Japan. In recent years, however, the 
Korean economy has notably slowed down, with huge youth 
unemployment and even more serious underemployment. The 
recent drastic slowdown of the Korean economy has raised the 
possibility that it might face similar “lost decades” as in Japan 
during the past two decades. When President Park Geun-hye 
took office in early 2013, she called for a second Miracle on the 
Han River and launched a 3-Year Plan for Economic Innovation. 
However, the 3-Year Plan relies too heavily on the government to 
take the initiative and play the leading role. If anything, the gov-
ernment is expected to play an even more important role than 
before, in taking major policy initiatives and disbursing enor-
mous public funds. In a truly globalized economy, there will be 
less room for Bureaufias to flourish in Korea. That is why the Park 
administration should complete FTAs with such major countries 
as China and Japan as soon as possible. It should also join the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In fact, completion of these FTAs 
should be considered as important as the government’s current 
deregulation drive.
Key Words: Korean economy, miracle on the Han River, new eco-
nomic paradigm for Korea
Introduction
Asia’s economy was far more advanced than the West until 
about 200 years ago. In 1700, the Asian economy was almost 
three times that of the United States and Europe combined, at 
62 percent and 23 percent respectively. Annual revenues of In-
dia’s Mogul emperor Aurangzeb (1658-1701) were estimated to 
be ten times those of his European contemporary, Louis XIV of 
France. In the early 19th century, the size of the Asian economy 
(58 percent) was twice as big as that of Europe and the United 
States combined (29 percent). However, the Asian economy ex-
perienced precipitous decline compared to the Western world, 
hitting its nadir in 1952, when it accounted for only 17 percent of 
the total world economy, compared to 58 percent for the West-
ern economy. During the two and a half centuries from 1700 un-
til 1952, the relative size of the Asian economy fell from three 
times that of the Western economy to only one-third.
The main cause of the relative Asian economic decline during 
the previous several centuries is its isolationistic policy. In par-
ticular, China—whose very name means the Middle Kingdom—
considered itself as the center of the world and the paragon of 
culture and civilization, while disdaining all other countries as 
barbarians. Such hubris cost Asia dearly when the economy in 
the Western world rapidly developed through industrial revolu-
tion and global exploration and colonization. Until the 18th cen-
tury, Asia had been a fertile ground for technical innovations in 
such products as gunpowder and the printing press. From the 
16th century, however, China practiced isolationist policies, ban-
ning further construction of ocean-going vessels, for example. 
While Europeans were motivated by “greed and passion” in their 
world exploration and commercial ventures, the Confucian state 
of China abhorred mercantile success.1
Dr. Yoon-shik Park is a Professor of International Finance with the George Washington University School of Business.  
His paper is the seventieth in KEI’s Academic Paper Series. As part of this program, KEI commissions and distributes  
approximately ten papers per year on original subjects of current interest to over 5,000 Korea watchers, government  
officials, think tank experts, and scholars around the United States and the world. At the end of the year, these papers 
are compiled and published in KEI’s On Korea volume. For more information, please visit www.keia.org/aps_on_korea.
Korea Economic Institute of America




Déjà Vu: Is Korea the Next Japan?
2ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
While the Western world encouraged global explorers and busi-
ness entrepreneurs in the ensuing centuries, Asia’s elites were 
mainly satisfied to be landed gentry, putting less emphasis on 
business ventures and profits and more on arts, poetry, litera-
ture and other scholarly pursuits. The traditional Asian value 
system of sha, nong, gong, sang (scholar mandarins, gentlemen 
farmers, artisans, and traders) has had persistent impact on the 
career choices of numerous bright young Asians. Such a value 
system discouraged many well-educated Asians from pursuing 
business careers, resulting in slower economic growth in Asia 
whose economy was mainly based on traditional agriculture in-
stead of manufacturing and trade. During Korea’s Choson dynas-
ty (1392-1910), for example, those who passed the civil-service 
exam could gain entry to the privileged yangban class, a schol-
arly aristocracy. This tradition continues in today’s education fe-
ver in South Korea.2 The essence of the traditional Asian value 
system nurtured strong family cohesion, emphasis on education 
and social order, and pervasive influence of government official-
dom. At the same time, it encouraged nepotism and cronyism, 
lack of transparency, pervasive corruption, less emphasis on rule 
of law and more on relationships, encouraging conformism and 
discouraging individualism.
The Asian economy embarked upon its catch-up race with the 
West from 1950s onward, in the midst of, or right after the Kore-
an War of 1950-53, when Japan first blazed new trails in industri-
alization and robust export drive. From the 1960s, the four Asian 
tiger economies of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Ko-
rea then followed. From the 1970s, the so-called Asian tiger cubs 
(Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia) also imitated 
the four tiger economies. These eight Asian economies achieved 
the highest growth rate in the world. During 1965-90, their per 
capita income grew at the average annual rate of over 5.5 per-
cent, while the comparable figure was less than 2 percent for 
the Latin American, Caribbean, Middle East and Mediterranean 
countries.3 This Asian growth momentum has infected other 
large Asian countries: China (1980s) and India (1990s) embarked 
upon serious industrialization and globalization of their own 
economies. The 21st century is now viewed as the Pacific Cen-
tury, as the global economic center seems to be pivoting from 
the Atlantic region to the Asia-Pacific arena.
The Asian economic resurgence was first initiated by Japan af-
ter the end of World War II. In 1951, the Japanese economy 
measured by its GDP was less than one-twentieth of the U.S. 
economy and only one-third of the British economy. But it grew 
rapidly during the subsequent three decades at a rate of almost 
10 percent per year. Its GDP grew to twice that of Britain and 
almost half of the U.S. economy by 1980, becoming the second 
largest economy of the world after the United States. Japan’s 
post-World War II economic miracle was memorialized in such 
books as Ezra Vogel’s Japan as Number One in 1979 and Chalm-
ers Johnson’s MITI (Ministry of International Trade & Industry) 
and the Japanese Miracle in 1982.
Miracle on the Han River
Similarly, Korea was able to replicate comparable economic 
successes as in Japan, even though the Korean economic drive 
started more than a decade later. During the Korean War, the 
already poor agrarian economy of South Korea was utterly dev-
astated and its infrastructure severely degraded. As late as 1965, 
Korea was poorer than India, with per capita GDP of only $106 
compared to $121 in India. But Korea’s per capita GDP grew 313 
times during the past 48 years to $33,200 (on purchasing power 
parity basis) in 2013,4 while India’s was only $4,000, just 33 times 
higher than that of 1965. Korea has achieved remarkable growth, 
with average annual rates of 9.2 percent in the 1970s, 9.8 per-
cent in the 1980s, and 6.6 percent in the 1990s.
Korea’s annual exports in goods and services rose from $40 mil-
lion in 1961 to $718 billion in 2013, an increase of 18,000 times 
over 52 years. The Korean economy has achieved a truly miracu-
lous growth since 1960s, becoming the world’s 12th largest econ-
omy today. Its per capita income level of $33,200 (on PPP basis) 
is comparable with that of Britain ($37,300), Japan ($37,100), 
France ($35,700) and the OECD average of $34,500, and higher 
than that of Spain ($30,100) and Italy ($29,600). This so-called 
Miracle on the Han River was achieved by the deliberate gov-
ernment policy of export-promoting open economy accompa-
nied by rapid development of the manufacturing sector aimed at 
export markets, as there was simply no domestic consumption 
base. Now Korea has become the 8th largest trading nation of the 
world, with its annual trade volume exceeding $1.1 trillion, from 
only $500 million in 1962.
The early years of Korea’s economic development were full of 
trials and challenges, but the Korean people overcame those 
difficulties by exploiting the country’s geographical and histori-
cal situations. Korean entrepreneurs initially took advantage of 
the advanced technical and marketing skills in neighboring Japan 
through joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements. After 
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having obtained their initial access to the Western markets with 
the assistance of Japanese joint venture partners, Korean busi-
nesses then chose to compete directly with their former mentors 
in Japan in international markets. Korea’s unique brand image has 
also advanced and broadened from the economic and commer-
cial field to the cultural arena, with the Hallyu (Korean Wave) in 
music, film, drama, sports and other entertainment areas.
Today, Korea is a world leader in several industries. It is number 
one in DRAM memory chips (66 percent global market share), 
LCD displays (51 percent global market share), shipbuilding (51 
percent global market share) and smartphones; number five 
in automobiles and refinery capacity; and number six in global 
steel production. Symbolic of the Korean industry’s global reach 
is Samsung Electronics, which in 2013 had an operating income 
of $35 billion, much higher than Toyota’s $24 billion. The com-
pany accounted for 25 percent of all the combined operating in-
come of Korea’s top 100 corporations in 2013. During the past 
23 years, the company’s annual sales revenues rose 50 times to 
$220 billion, while its operating income rose 60 times.
Reasons for Korea’s Past Economic Successes
For nearly a decade after the end of the Korean War in 1953, 
Korea’s post-war socio-political turmoil hampered any earnest 
attempts to jump-start economic development. However, Ko-
rea embarked upon economic development seriously from the 
early 1960s following the 1961 military coup led by General Park 
Chung-hee. In the initial stages, however, the country faced for-
midable challenges: it was an extremely poor agrarian economy, 
with a negligible domestic consumer market and weak entrepre-
neurial base. The country suffered from lack of capital, technol-
ogy, and business management talent. The founder of today’s 
mighty Samsung Group, the late Chairman Lee Byung-chull, 
started his business career as a tiny rice mill operator in his ru-
ral home village during the Japanese occupation. The founder of 
Hyundai Group, the late Chairman Chung Ju-yung, first started 
his business career as a puny car repair shop owner in Seoul.
Faced with formidable barriers to economic development, the 
Korean government decided to be the primary mover behind 
modernizing the economy by adopting a government-led indus-
trialization policy. The military government tried to overcome 
the primitive and small domestic market by focusing its indus-
trial policy on nurturing export-promoting industries to access 
vast foreign markets instead of a tiny and poor domestic market. 
In order to conserve meager foreign exchange reserves, the gov-
ernment also encouraged development of import-substituting 
industries. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that the first modern 
business ventures that Samsung Group embarked upon success-
fully were a sugar refining business to substitute for imported 
sugar and a wool textile business to replace expensive imported 
textile products from abroad.5 The government also encouraged 
inward direct investments from modern Western corporations to 
bring in both technology and management know-how as well as 
investment capital.
First-generation Korean entrepreneurs complemented their lack 
of modern management skills and industrial experience through 
foreign joint ventures or technology licenses from advanced 
countries. Japanese companies served as the role model for, and 
often joint venture partners with, new Korean business firms. 
Samsung Electronics Corporation benefitted initially from its ear-
ly joint venture with Japan’s NEC. Today’s premier Korean hotel, 
Shilla Hotel, started initially as a joint venture with Japan’s Hotel 
Okura. The world-renowned Korean steel company, POSCO, was 
initially funded by a large loan from the Export-Import Bank of 
Japan and it also benefitted from technical assistance from major 
Japanese steel companies in its early years.
Korean economic success was similar to that of the other 
three so-called Asian tiger economies of Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Singapore, each of which faced its own existential security 
threats. Both Taiwan and Hong Kong, peopled with refugees 
from Communist China, had to face both real and imagined 
threats of invasion by the newly unified Communist China. 
Singapore, the tiny non-Muslim city-state that became inde-
pendent from Malaysia in 1965, was surrounded by the largest 
Muslim country of Indonesia to its south and by the Islamic 
state of Malaysia to the north.6 For these countries, economic 
development and industrialization were the primary means to 
secure national survival from much larger and potentially hos-
tile neighboring countries.
Korea pursued government-led free and open market economy, 
relying upon international trade as the means to access ad-
vanced technology and management know-how as well as huge 
foreign markets for its exports. In the initial decades of Korea’s 
industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s, the United States was 
the most important economic partner for Korea. While the U.S. 
security umbrella was essential for Korea to pursue its rapid in-
dustrialization despite constant security threats from North Ko-
rea, the U.S. market was also the most important destination for 
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Korean exports during those early decades. Also, Korea pursued 
mercantilist policy in its trade with the United States, with an 
aggressive export drive combined with both overt and covert re-
strictive measures on imports through high tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers. The United States acquiesced on Korea’s export-orient-
ed policies, mainly because the United States recognized Korea’s 
frontier role during the Cold War between the Soviet bloc and 
the free world.
Deteriorating Performance of the Korean Economy
In recent years, however, the Korean economy has notably 
slowed down, with huge youth unemployment and even more 
serious under-employment. Korea’s average annual economic 
growth rate was 9.2 percent in the 1970s, 9.8 percent in the 
1980s, and 6.6 percent in the 1990s. But its average annual 
growth rate slowed down markedly to 4.2 percent in 2000s, and 
the economy grew only 3.7 percent in 2011, 2.0 percent in 2012 
and 2.8 percent in 2013.8 Many of the big Korean industrial gi-
ants such as Samsung and Hyundai have increasingly moved 
their new investments abroad to low-cost regions such as South 
Asia and Eastern Europe. Between 1995 and 2010, Korea’s larg-
est manufacturing firms shifted 17 percent of their production to 
overseas plants.8 As a result, total employment in such compa-
nies fell by 2 percent annually. Consequently, the share of work-
ers employed at large Korean companies fell by one-third, from 
18 percent to 12 percent.
According to a review by a respectable Korean economic daily,9 
the overseas workforce of Samsung Electronics more than dou-
bled during the past four years from 72,915 in 2009 to 190,206 
in 2013, while that of Hyundai Motors also doubled from 22,500 
to 41,800 during the same period. In contrast, their respective 
domestic workforce rose only modestly from 85,000 to 95,700 
at Samsung Electronics and from 56,000 to 62,800 at Hyundai 
Motors. A similar trend was observed at POSCO, where the over-
seas workforce increased from 17,500 to 22,100 during 2009-13, 
while the number of their domestic employees declined from 
36,000 to 32,000. This trend is likely to continue in the coming 
years, as large Korean firms tend to decrease their domestic 
investments in the face of high Korean wages and belligerent 
strike-prone labor unions. Hyundai Motors is reportedly plan-
ning a second car manufacturing plant in North America, with 
annual production capacity of 300,000 cars. Its first American 
plant in the right-to-work state of Alabama has been operating 
at capacity for 24 hours per day with three production shifts, a 
practice surely to be resisted violently in Korea by domestic au-
tomobile labor unions. Due to the deteriorating competitiveness 
of Korea, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have worsened in 
recent years. Korea’s FDI outflows rose from $6.1 billion in 1997 
to $35.1 billion in 2013, an increase of 470 percent, while FDI 
inflows into Korea rose from $6.9 billion to $14.5 billion, an in-
crease of only 108 percent.
Korean wages are relatively high compared to its competitors. 
Even though Taiwan’s per capita income is higher than that of Ko-
rea, the starting salaries of Korean college graduates are two to 
three times higher than those of Taiwan. Because of the strong 
strike-prone labor unions in Korea, especially at large firms in 
banking and telecom industries, Korean wage levels are often 
higher than those of the United States and Europe. On the oth-
er hand, a study by the Conference Board in the United States 
finds that Korea’s hourly labor productivity stands at 48 percent 
of America, which is 30th in the world, even lower than that of 
Greece. Reflecting the deteriorating business environment dur-
ing the past couple of years, 40 percent of Korea’s top 30 chae-
bol firms found their operating income falling short of covering 
even their interest expenses. Recently, Samsung Electronics also 
had to concede its number one position in smartphone market 
shares in China to Xiaomi and in India to Micromax. The company 
is also likely to find its operating income falling drastically to 3-4 
trillion won in the 3rd quarter of 2014, compared to 10 trillion 
won a year earlier. During the same period, Hyundai Motors’ op-
erating income is likely to decline by half from 2 trillion won last 
year to 1 trillion won this year. Hyundai Heavy Industries, the 
world’s number one shipbuilder, is also expected to suffer a loss 
in operating income of over 1 trillion won in both the 2nd and 3rd 
quarters of 2014.
According to the latest survey published by World Economic Fo-
rum in 2014, Korea’s international competitiveness has also fall-
en to 26th, the lowest in 10 years,10 while other Asian countries 
have retained much higher rankings, with Japan (6th), Hong Kong 
(7th), Taiwan (14th), and Malaysia (20th). The Korean banking sys-
tem was ranked at 122nd and the entire Korean financial system 
fell to the bottom at 144th, with the return on assets of Korean 
banks at 0.38 percent, which is the lowest in Asia. The ranking of 
144th for the Korean banking and financial system in the competi-
tiveness index was much lower than even Kenya (24th), Ghana 
(62nd) and Uganda (81st).
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At the same time, the quality of life in Korea shows signs of seri-
ous deterioration. With 29.1 suicides out of 100,000 each year, 
Korea has the highest suicide rate and the 3rd highest traffic fa-
tality rate among the 34 OECD member countries. Even when 
Korea’s population is fast aging, Korea’s 1.2 birth rate is among 
the three lowest in the world along with Hong Kong and Ma-
cao. At the same time, the Korean business world is undergoing 
momentous generational transitions, as the founding families of 
many Korean chaebol firms are going through the handover of 
management from the second to third generation.
The first generation founding patriarchs of Korean chaebols were 
pioneer entrepreneurs and masters in government-business al-
liances, and they spectacularly succeeded in trailblazing new 
business frontiers ranging from consumer products to construc-
tion, heavy industries, and electronics. Their second generation 
successors have then globalized their businesses, turning Korean 
chaebol firms into true multinational corporations (MNCs) with 
globally recognized trademarks such as Samsung, Hyundai, SK, 
LG, etc. However, the third generation leaders are not yet tested 
fully, as they have labored quietly under the watchful eyes of their 
fathers. These third generation leaders are far better educated 
both inside and outside Korea at major academic institutions, 
thus gaining deeper insights into international issues. These new 
leaders, however, are more likely to exercise a finance-oriented 
management style instead of entrepreneurial initiatives, more 
eager to safeguard the existing fortune that their families have 
accumulated rather than risking their fortune in new ventures. 
The successful transition to the third generation leaders of Ko-
rean chaebols, and how they will perform in the coming decades, 
is critically important to the future of the Korean economy.
Need for a New Economic Growth Model
Recent drastic slowdown of the Korean economy has raised the 
possibility that it might face similar “lost decades” as in Japan 
during the past two decades. After miraculously achieving a real 
growth rate of almost 10 percent per year during the two de-
cades of 1950s and 1960s and close to 5 percent per year during 
the 1970s and 1980s despite two oil crises and other economic 
turmoil, the Japanese economic growth rate drastically slowed 
down to just 0.8 percent per year during the past two decades 
since 1996. The “lost two decades” in Japan began with the real 
estate bubble burst in the early 1990s, which led to the asset 
price free fall and price deflation, which led to sharp income 
and consumption decline which encouraged further economic 
depression and price deflation, in a vicious cycle. The Japanese 
government also failed to coordinate its policy responses, adopt-
ing only the expansionary fiscal policy financed by government 
borrowing, without concomitant monetary policy support. Con-
sequently, Japan’s outstanding government debt grew from 68 
percent of GDP in 1990 to 142 percent in 2000 and 230 percent 
in 2010. At the same time, the unstable political scene with 13 
prime ministers over 20 years since 1993 did not help in instilling 
confidence in its economic policy making.
When the current prime minister Shinzo Abe took office in De-
cember 2012, he adopted “Abenomics” to combat the Japanese 
economic malaise, consisting of “three arrows”: aggressive mon-
etary easing (monetary policy), expansion of public spending 
(fiscal policy), and structural reform (growth policy). The Abe 
administration was convinced that insufficient monetary easing 
had caused the Japanese economy to sink further into chronic 
deflation in the past couple of decades. In response, Mr. Abe 
hired as his new central bank governor Haruhiko Kuroda, then 
president of the Asian Development Bank and a vocal proponent 
of aggressive monetary easing. Since 2013, in an effort to push 
inflation to the 2 percent target, the Bank of Japan under Gov-
ernor Kuroda has energetically pursued quantitative easing (QE) 
thereby almost doubling its balance sheet via aggressive bond 
purchases. The second arrow of Abenomics consists of massive 
fiscal spending on key public projects like infrastructure in order 
to kick-start an economic recovery. As part of this drive, the Abe 
administration has earmarked 200 trillion yen for public works 
projects over the next 10 years to guard against earthquakes and 
other natural disasters. The third arrow consists of growth-en-
hancing structural reforms. This strategy aims to spur growth of 
private-sector firms through drastic deregulation and liberaliza-
tion of the entire economy, especially reducing the influence of 
government in various sectors of the economy. This third arrow 
would require a fundamental paradigm change in the traditional 
role of government in the Japanese economy. However, even op-
timists concede that drastic deregulation and other growth-en-
hancing structural reform initiatives will take years to implement 
and even longer to have any effect on economic growth in Japan.
So far, Abenomics has had disappointing results. Japan’s big 
sales tax increase in April 2014 severely impacted the economy 
as people rushed to spend money before the tax increase took 
effect, resulting in a consumer spending crash much steeper 
than the last time Japan raised the sales tax in 1997. More trou-
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bling has been a broader economic slowdown since Abenom-
ics was launched. Once the tax-related economic gyrations are 
averaged out, the Japanese economy experienced virtually zero 
real growth between mid-2013 and mid-2014. Despite aggres-
sive monetary easing, wage rates have stayed depressed as the 
labor market dynamics have changed. In Japan, baby boomers 
are now retiring and taking the best paid jobs with them. Their 
replacements are far more likely to be part-timers, contractors 
and other lower-wage workers. Even though the yen has depre-
ciated more than 20 percent since the beginning of Abenomics, 
its impact on Japan’s trade balance has been not as positive as 
before. The reason is that Japan has become a net importer after 
the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, due to increased im-
ports of foreign oil and gas. Yen depreciation has thus caused 
the real income of average Japanese to fall. There has been also 
a fundamental shift in Japan’s manufacturing sector, as Japanese 
companies make more of their products abroad than they did 
during the past comparable period of yen weakness nearly a de-
cade ago. Thus, a weaker yen has made the trade deficit bigger, 
not smaller.
Like the Japanese economy since the 1990s, the Korean econo-
my has also slowed down markedly in recent years, raising the 
specter of a Korean version of “lost decades.” Faced with nu-
merous economic structural problems mentioned earlier, it is 
quite clear that Korea has to reorient its economic development 
strategy from manufacturing and export orientation to nurtur-
ing the service sector and domestic consumption. The Korean 
service sector remains truly underdeveloped, accounting for 
only 58 percent of GDP, compared to 80 percent in the United 
States. The Korean economy has to be diversified from a nar-
row manufacturing focus to the service industries through bold 
deregulation and liberalization. In this way, the Korean economy 
can have a more balanced modern economy to create more jobs 
and to join the rank of truly advanced countries. Since 1970s, the 
world’s advanced countries have embarked upon the transfor-
mation of their economy from the manufacturing sector towards 
the service industries.
The manufacturing sector in the United States accounted for 22 
percent of total employment in 1970 but it declined to 10 per-
cent in 2007. The Korean manufacturing sector accounted for a 
peak of 29 percent of total employment in 1989, but its share has 
steadily declined over the past two decades to 17 percent in 2008. 
However, the service sector’s productivity in Asia, as it is in Korea, 
is estimated at only one-third of Switzerland and one-half of the 
United States. This productivity gap is due to the fact that the ser-
vice industries in Korea are concentrated in infrastructure services 
such as wholesale and retail sales, transportation and warehous-
ing, food services and lodgings, real estate agencies, and personal 
services.11 These businesses account for 34 percent of total em-
ployment, compared with 29 percent in Germany and 26 percent 
in Finland. On the other hand, Korea’s service sector is relatively 
underdeveloped in the high-value knowledge service industries 
such as banking, finance, insurance, telecommunication, health 
care, tourism, logistics, software, and research and development.
In the financial service industries in particular, Korea’s competi-
tiveness is well below that of advanced countries, even though 
the manufacturing sector in Korea has produced many global 
winners in electronics, steel, and shipbuilding. The main reason 
for the relative backwardness of Korea’s finance industry com-
pared to its manufacturing sector can be traced to the govern-
ment’s export-led growth strategy from the 1960s through 1980s. 
Thus, it is critically important for Korea to now nurture the high 
value-added knowledge service sector instead of the relatively 
low skilled and low value-added infrastructure service industries. 
Developing international financial centers in Korea’s major cities 
such as Seoul and Busan is one way to advance the banking and 
financial industries in Korea to the level of globally competitive 
players. Successful international financial centers also nurture 
the development of other advanced knowledge service indus-
tries such as world-class medical and health care services and 
educational institutions, sophisticated telecommunications, and 
renowned cultural institutions.13
However, the greatest barrier to modernizing the Korean service 
sector is the suffocating regulations and bureaucratic meddling 
by Korea’s government. The Korean service sector needs drastic 
deregulation and far less bureaucratic interference in order for 
the Korean economy to advance to the next level. The paradigm 
change for the Korean economy has to start with comprehensive 
economic deregulation and liberalization, combined with a dras-
tic reduction in the power of government bureaucracy.
Korea’s small and medium enterprises have not developed as 
strongly as they should, and many of them have stayed mainly as 
subcontractors to large chaebol firms. Unless Korean SMEs adopt 
more independent growth strategies based on solid technology 
and more diversified market channels, they are likely to remain 
overly dependent upon chaebol firms and their future prospects 
are not bright. In this sense, the government should adopt more 
proactive strategies to nurture Korean SMEs, including special-
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ized financing channels and promotion of internationalization 
drives. The tax system, including inheritance taxes, should be 
streamlined so that management of SMEs can be smoothly tran-
sitioned from generation to generation, as practiced in Japan and 
other advanced countries.
The Creative Economy: 3-Year Plan for  
Economic Innovation
When President Park Geun-hye took office in early 2013, she 
called for a second Miracle on the Han River. On February 25, 
2014, the first anniversary of her inauguration, President Park 
announced the details of a 3-Year Plan for Economic Innova-
tion. It called for revitalization of the Korean economy with the 
goal of 4 percent potential growth, 70 percent employment 
rate and $40,000 per capita GDP (at market exchange rate, 
compared to $26,000 in 2013).14 The new Park administration 
has made the development of a “creative economy” the core 
of its strategy to achieve the 474 goal. As the Korean economy 
has reached the rank of many advanced economies in products 
and technology, the new plan reflects increasing recognition 
that Korea has reached the limits of its previous “fast follower” 
economic strategies and that it has to become a creative “first 
mover” economy. It is clear that Korea’s economic future criti-
cally depends upon becoming a global leader in developing and 
commercializing innovative techniques, products, services and 
business methods.
The 3-Year Plan includes three strategies to achieve this creative 
economy. The first one is to develop strong fundamentals for 
achieving the goal by reforming the public sector, developing the 
rule-based market economy, and building a strong social safety 
net. The government will reform the public sector, which has been 
plagued by inappropriate practices and low productivity, due to 
the moral hazard pervasive in that sector such as lax management, 
high debt ratios and various types of rent-seeking behavior. By in-
troducing competition between public institutions, as well as with 
the private sector, the productivity of public institutions is to be 
enhanced. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) will also be required to 
reduce their debt-to-equity ratios from an average of 239 percent 
in 2013 to no more than 200 percent in 2017. Public-sector ef-
ficiency is to be enhanced by eliminating 600 overlapping govern-
ment programs during the next three years. The social safety net 
will also be strengthened through expanded earned income tax 
credit and increased unemployment insurance coverage.
The second strategy is to develop a dynamic economy based on 
innovation, by promoting venture businesses and vibrant SMEs. 
For this purpose, the government intends to invest 4 trillion won 
($3.9 billion) public funds to seed the start-up funds for young en-
trepreneurs and angel investments. In addition, the government 
will launch a new fund in cooperation with global venture capital 
companies to invest in Korean start-ups. To encourage foreign 
investor participation, they will be allowed to buy the govern-
ment’s share at a low price and the government will be the first 
to bear losses. The government will also establish 17 “Creative 
Economy Innovation Centers” in major cities by 2015. The cen-
ters are to become the focal point of regional development by 
supporting start-ups through a range of services including educa-
tion, technology development, and financing. R&D investment, 
which was the highest in the OECD at 4.4 percent of GDP in 2012, 
is to be increased to 5 percent by 2017. The government plans 
to invite 300 world-class scientists and researchers by 2017 by 
providing competitive financial support and guaranteeing a suffi-
ciently long stay in Korea. The government will introduce policies 
to promote exports by smaller firms. At present, only 2.7 percent 
of Korean SMEs export, and the goal is to raise the ratio signifi-
cantly in part by completing a FTA with China.
The third strategy is aimed at an economy balanced between do-
mestic demand and exports, reflecting a more mature market 
economy. By improving the domestic investment environment, 
the plan focuses on raising the employment rate to 70 percent 
from the current 65 percent level. Structural weaknesses con-
straining domestic demand will be addressed. Household debt, 
which rose to 164 percent of household disposable income 
in 2012, one of the highest in the OECD, is to be lowered by 5 
percent by 2017 through enhanced financial supervision and 
regulation. The government will promote ambitious regulatory 
reform to promote business investment. For this purpose, the 
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government will reduce the regulatory burden by introducing a 
“one-in, one-out” system and by strengthening the sunset clause 
for existing regulations. The government will boost the employ-
ment ratio of the working-age population by creating more jobs 
for women and youth through flexible childcare services and 
strengthening financial and legal support for part-time jobs.
Recommendations to Strengthen the 3-Year Plan
President Park has defined “creative economy” as the concept 
of creating new industries and employment through the conver-
gence of science and technology with industry, the fusion of cul-
ture and industry, and the blossoming of creativity. The success 
of this noble goal depends on how effectively the government 
can catalyze development of vibrant innovation ecosystems. It 
also requires that the government and the private sector coop-
erate seamlessly to promote creative energy in technology, busi-
ness ventures and new product development. It further calls for 
a deft balance between public nurturing and private initiatives, a 
task not easily achieved in practice.
Furthermore, a creative economy in this fiercely competitive and 
globalized business environment cannot be incubated and nur-
tured successfully with the public sector playing the leadership 
role as before. With the globalized economy and fast-changing 
technology and market environment, private sector initiatives 
are critically important as the main engine of progress—with the 
government playing an auxiliary role. This is quite different from 
the start of Korean industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s. Nev-
ertheless, the 3-Year Plan relies too heavily on the government 
with its major policy initiatives and disbursement of public funds. 
For example, under its second strategy, the government intends 
to inject $3.9 billion by 2017 to help venture businesses and 
SMEs. The government is also to launch a new venture fund to 
invest in Korean start-ups, and R&D investment is to be increased 
from 4.4 percent in 2012 to 5 percent by 2017. The government 
also plans to provide more childcare services and more finan-
cial support for part-time jobs. Even though some of these plans 
would be carried out in partnership with the private sector, these 
initiatives would further increase the central role of government 
in the economy.
However, the main challenge facing the Korean economy now 
is the pervasive influence of the government in every nook and 
cranny of the economy, which is the undesirable legacy of the 
government-led economic development drive of 1960s through 
1980s. Even though the active government role in the initial 
years of Korean economic development was generally posi-
tive, its beneficial impact is now far outweighed by its negative 
side effects. Both Korea’s economy and its society have been 
suffering from the pervasive influence peddling and outright 
corruption of the present and former government bureaucrats, 
formerly known in Korea as “Mofias” (combining the words of 
former and present Ministry of Finance officials and mafia). The 
Mofias occupy plum jobs at major Korean financial institutions 
after their retirement and have been blamed for the backward 
status of the entire Korean banking and financial system, as in-
dicated in the recent Global Competitiveness Index. However, a 
recent series of major accidents such as the sinking of Korean 
ferry Sewol resulting in more than 300 deaths, unscheduled 
power outages due to defective parts from subcontractors at 
critical nuclear power plants, and frequent accidents involving 
high-speed railcars have exposed the pervasive corruption and 
collusion between current and retired government bureaucrats. 
Thus, the entire Korean economy is found to suffer not just from 
Mofias but from Bureaufias (former and present bureaucrats 
and mafia) at the Ministries of Transportation, Fishery and Mari-
time Affairs, Education, Commerce and Industry, Health and Hu-
man Services, for example.
Therefore, the Korean economy needs to drastically reduce both 
the number and power of bureaucrats in order to regain its for-
mer dynamism. One of the most effective ways to reduce the in-
fluence of Bureaufias is to globalize the Korean economy, as the 
open economy will force every sector of the Korean society to 
stay more efficient and productive in order to survive and pros-
per. Their survival and prosperity will no longer depend upon 
how effectively they lobby the various government bureaucra-
cies through hiring of Bureaufias but upon efficient management 
and improved productivity. That is why the Park administration 
should complete FTAs with such major countries as China and 
Japan, and join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as soon as 
possible. In fact, completion of these FTAs should be considered 
as important as the government’s current deregulation drive. In 
order to facilitate these FTAs, President Park should not rely on 
senior bureaucrats. Instead, she should hire retired senior busi-
ness executives to negotiate and push through these FTAs, not 
just for increasing Korea’s trade volumes but also to enhance Ko-
rea’s economic efficiency through opening up to fierce interna-
tional competition.
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